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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
13russels,  22. II. 1995 
COM(95)  5lJ I  final 
COMMUNICATION  I;I<OM THF COMMISSION '!ll..TL!L COUNCIL 
ON THE SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT FOR THE IJVIPLElVIENTA TION 
OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED  NATIONS  CONVENTION  ON THE 
LA \V  OF THE SEA  OF lOth  DECEMBER 1982  RELATING TO 
THE CONSERVATION  AND  MANAGEMENT  OF STRADDLING  STOCKS AND 
HIGHLY  MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS Communication from the Commission to the Council 
Part A 
Explanatory Memorandum 
On 4 August 1995, the United Nations' Conference on Straddling Stocks (stocks offish which 
are found  both inside and outside exclusive economic zones) and  Highly  Migratory Species 
adopted. without a vote, a dratl J\greement
1 for the purposes of applying the provisions of the 
United  Nations Convention on the  Law  of the  Sea of I 0  December  1982 as  regards  the 
conservation and management of these stocks. 
The  Community  has  now  to  decide  whether  to  sign this  Agreement  with  a  view  to  later 
rati lication. 
This decision should take itito account both the context or the development or international 
relations in  fisheries and the negotiating instructions given by  the Council. 
A detailed evaluation of the draft Agreement is  attached in  Annex B. 
The Community has  played an important role  in· the development of international  fishing 
relations both by defending the interests of countries fishing the  high  seas and in  affirming 
· its  commitment to  effective measures to conserve and manage resources. 
'!'his central role of the Community would be put in doubt if it  were to reject the conclusions 
or this conference.  It would  then  be in  a  very minority  posititm  which  would  exclude any 
possibility of n:ncgotiating the terms of the Agreement and could only lead on to  undesirable 
developments in  international relations concernirig iisheries. 
The Conimunity has achieved the· goals that it set itself in  the  most impoitant areas of the 
negotiations,  in  particular on the three points  which were considered as  primordial  by  the 
Council of tlsheries ministers held on 15  June  1995, namely the necessarily open character 
of  regional  tisheries ·organizations,  safeguarding of the  jurisdiction  of flag  states  and  a 
balance in obligations as  between coastal states and flag states. 
In  the  area  of the  management  and  conservation  of fishery  resources,  the  Agreement 
introdu;;es a number of improvements which should make it  possible to  deal  positively with 
the  current  difficult  situation  which  is  the  source  of manit()ld  tensions  among  countries 
involved in  lishery activities. 
This proposal is designed to  make it possible for the Community to  sign this Agreement on 
4  December.  which  is  the  date  on  which  it  will  be  opened  ror  signature  by  the  states 
concerned at th.i headquarters of the United Nations. 
Document A I CONL164/33 of 3 August  1995. This signature is an exclusive competence of  the Community. on the basis of  the requirement 
under  the  common  lisheries  policy  that  uniform  rules  apply  on  identicat  terms  to  all 
Commupity nationals. This exclusive competence of the Community. which the Commission 
is  determined to  defend;  will result in  an  undertaking on behalf of all  the  Member States, 
which in  turn are responsible for  adopting measures for the effective implementation of the 
Agreement to  their vessels and nationals. 
I~ Part- B 
Proposal 
On  the  basis or the evaluation given above and  in Annex  l3,  the  Comnflssion proposes that 
the Co unci I decide that 
(/\)  1\1  file c;ll·licst  upporlunity. the 'Luropcall  l 'otillllllllily siHntld  sigtl  1hc  A!,!rl'ellll'nt  rnr 
the  purposes urapplying the provisions ofthc United  Nations l \>m-ention on  the  Law 
ur the  Sea  or  10  December  19H2  relating  to  the  CllllS\.TV~ltion  <llld  managcm_cnt  of 
straddling stllcks ;md  highly  migratory species,  <It  the  .~;unc Lilllc  dej)ositing  with  the 
Secrctariat-( icneral or the  United Nations a statement  in  conlr1rm it y with Article 4  7. 
paragraph 2 (a)  of the  Agreement as  well  as  interpretative statements in  accordatice 
with Annex A hereto; 
(b)  the  President of the Council should appoint the person entitled to sign the Agreement 
in  the name of the European Community. 
3 ANNEXA 
Statements by the Community to be deposited 
at the time of the sign.ing of tbe Agreement 
A.  Statemenl·of L--ompt-'lencc in  a~cordance with Article 47{2){a) 
B.  Interpretative statement 
0  iii!ji!!Jiliii11111d!li211!. IH:CLARATION OF THE ElJROPEAN COMMUNlTV 
1\'fiADE  J>llRSUANT TO ARTICLE 47(2) OF THE Agreement FOR THE 
IM-PLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF UNCLOS RELATING TO 
THE CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF STRADDLING STOCKS AND 
HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES 
Article 4 7(2)(a) of the Agreement stipul4tes that in cases where an  international organization 
as  relerred to  in  Annex  IX, Article  I, of the  Convention  has  cumpet.:ncc over all  matters 
governed  by  this  Agreement,  at  the  time  of signature  or  accession,  such  international 
organization shall  make a declaration stating:  · 
(i)  that it  has competence 1!1r  all  matters governed by  this AgrccmcnL 
( i  i)  that,  J(lr  this  reason,  its  Member Stales shall  not  become  States  parties.  except  in 
respec! lll' their territories for which the international organization has no responsibility 
and 
(iii)  that it  accepts the rights and obligations of States under this  Agreement. 
Pursuant to  this provision the European Community hereby declares 
(i)  that it has competence over all  matters governed by this Agreement 
(ii)  that  for  this  reason  its  Member  States  shall  not  become  States  Parties.  except  in 
respect of their territories for which the European Community has  no  responsibility 
.and 
(iii)  that it  accepts the rights and obligations of States under this Agreement llr.dl interpretative statement 
I.  On  signing  the  Agreement lor the  implementation of the  provisions of the  Ui1ited 
Nations  Convention on the  Law of the  Sea of I 0  December  1982  relating  to  the 
conservation and  management of straddling stocks and  highly  migratory species, the 
European Community declares that it considers that the Agrecmei1t constitutes a major 
effort in ensuring the long-term conservation and sustainable  use  of straddling fish 
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and in promoting international cooperation to 
that end. 
2.  The European Community notes that Article 21  is  not applicable before the expiry of 
the  period of two years mentioned in that Article. This transitional  period  gives no 
State the right to  mailllain or apply unilateral measun;s pending the establishment of 
inspection schemes by  regional or subregit1nal  fisheries management organi:t..ations or 
arrangements. 
:>.  For the  purposes ol" applying Artidc 21  or the J\greemenL  it  is  the  understanding of 
the  European  Community that  when  the  llag  state  declares  that  it  will  exercise  its 
jurisdiction over a tishing vessel tlying its llag on the high seas, the authorities or the 
inspecting State shall immediately abandon the  vessel  and  leave to  the discretion of 
the flag state the measures to be til-ken with regard to that fishing vesseL in  accordance 
with Article 19 of the Agreement. Any dispute regarding this issue must be  settled in 
·conformity with the procedures provided for  in Part VIII  or the Agreement (Peaceful 
settlement of disputes). No State shall invoke such disputes to justify keeping control, 
on the high seas, of a vessel which does not fly  its  t1ag. 
4.  The European Community stresses that the use of force in  Article 22 is an exceptional 
measure based on the strictest respect of the principle of proportionality and that any 
abuse will expose the inspec.ting State to  international  liability. 
The European ( 'ommunity considers furthermore  that  the  wording of the  Agreement 
on this issue must he rendered more spcci til: in accordance with the  relevant principles 
or  international  law  in  the  framework  of the  regional  ;llld  suhn.:gional  lisherics 
management organizations and arrangements ltlrcscen. ANNEX  B 
l~valuation of the results of the United Nations Conference on straddling stocks 
and highly migratory fish  stocks Ev~tluation of the results of the United Nations Conference on straddling stocks 
and highly migratory fish stucli.s 
On 4  August 1995  the United Nations Conference on Straddling Stocks (stocks of tish 
which are found both inside and outside exclusive economic zones) and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks adopted,  without  a  vote,  a  draJt  Agreement  fi.lr  the  implementation of the 
provisions of the l lnitcd Nuti(ms Convention on the l.aw of lhL' Sc;1 o!' I 0 December  19X2 
as  regards the eoriservation and management or these stocks. 
1 
In  a  letter~  addressed  to  the  President  of the  Conference  the  Community  said  its 
competent authorities would evaluate the Agreement in order to verify whether the terms 
of reference·; which the United Nations Generai Assembly had given the Conference had 
been properly observed. 
The  evaluation·  bad  also  to  take  into  account,  at  Community  level.  the  ncgotmtmg 
directives~ drawn up by the Council in the light of  the political priorities laid down in  the 
conclusions of the Council meeting of 15  June 1995 on  fisheries.' 
The purpose of this paper is to set the Commission's assessment before the Council and 
Parliament so that they can make the necessary evaluation. 
l.Part One - General evaluation 
1.1.  Political and economic aspects 
1.1. I.  Context o(  international fisheries  relations 
The Agreement \.vas  signed in a climate of worsening relations between states fishing on 
the high seas and coastal states.  This situation was not confined to  relations between the 
Community and Canada but also concerned many other countries in  other regions of the 
world. 
The outcome of the Conference must be assessed in  the light of the evolving pattern of 
the law of the  sea with its changes and conf1icts  since the  second world war uri.der  the 
expansionist pressure of the coastal states. 
For centuries relations between coastal states were based on the  theory of the ti·eed01n 
of the  seas  nnd  the jurisdiction conferred  upon  them  by  common  law  was  generally 
contined to three miles. 
Document A/CONF  .164/33 of 3  August 1995. 
Document A/CONF.l64/L50 of 7 August 1995 (see Annex Ill). 
Document A/RES/471192 of29 January  1993 (see Annex!!!). 
Document 8819/95 Peche 289 of 14 July  1995 (see Annex Ill). 
Minutes  Fisheries  Council  of  15  June  Doc.  8098/95  nf  22  June 1995  (see 
Annex  III). 
2 The legal concept of territorial waters was not adopted until the 1958 Geneva Convention 
and states did  not really subsequently harmonize the limits  they  applied, which  varied 
fl·om  3  to  12 ·miles.  Beyond  them,  the  principle  of the  J"reedom  of'  the  high  seas 
continued to apply. 
The concept of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 miles emerged in the seventies 
and after a period of  disagreement was enshrined in the 1982 United  Nations Convention 
on  the  La\v  of the  Sea (UNLOSC).  The same Conventioi1  consnlicbted  the  maximuin 
extent or the  territorial  sea  at  12  miles  and  struck  a  balance  ol"  interests  between  the 
coastal states and the slates with an  interest in  the traditional  freedom or the high seas. 
New  concepts  have since  been  put  forward  such  as  the  "mar presencia!"  or custodial 
jurisdiction or the  reference· to  the possibility of extenging the  EI~Z to  250 or even 300 
miles.  The  unilateral  measures adopted  by  Canada at  the  beginning ol"  1995  when  it 
applied  national  decisions on  the  high  seas  to  conserve lisheries resources  tend  in  the 
same direction. although at the same time they were probably designed deliberately to put 
pressure on the Conference. 
This context must be taken into consideration in looking at the need to  reach a balanced 
solution in oi·der to put an end to  disputes in international fisheries relations. 
The  outcome  of the  Conference  must  be  viewed  in  a  general  context  of efforts  to 
strengthen and stabilize the legal framework for international fisheries relations and ward 
otT the danger of insidious legislation by the coastal states.  The international instruments 
which  have  to  be  considered  in  this  context  are,  in  addition .to  the  Agreement,  the 
following: 
the  United Nations Convention on the  Law of  the  Sea, which entered. into  force 
in November 1994; · 
the Agreement adopted under the F  AO in  1993 encouraging vessels fishing on the 
high seas to  observe international conservation and  management measures; 
code  of conduct  for  responsible  fisheries,  due  to  be· approved  by  the  F  AO 
Conference in  October 1995. 
The objective of stabilizing the  legal framework for  international  relations  is  in  itself 
strengthened by  the  incorporation  ii1  the draft Agreement of Part VTI!  on  the  peaceful 
settlement of disputes. 
All  the  provisions  of the  Agreement  should  make  it  possible  actually  to  apply  the 
principle  of  international  cooperati011  laid  down  by  the  UNI ,OSC  lor  effective 
management and  conservation of 1isheries resources and to  intrmluce arrangements for 
supervising and monitoring fishing on the high seas which will  help tackle the problem 
of fishing  by  vessels  t1ying  the  flag  of states  which  do  not  meet  their  international 
obligations in this respect. 
The Community cannot directly  or  indirectly  back  up  failure  by  certain  parties  to  act 
responsibly  in  supervising  fishing  on  the  high  seas,  since  this  would  be  bound  to 
encoumge certain states to take unilateral, illicit action that could ultimately give rise to 
undesirable developments in the law of the sea  . 
.., 
J 1  t should also be noted that the imprecision of  some of the Agreement's provisions entails 
a  risk  of  disputes  over  interpretation,  conflict  at  sea  and  inadmissible  claims  of 
jurisdiction by ce11ain  coastal states, which would undermine the ohjective or stahilizing 
the  legal  ti·anH:work  fix intematit)nal  relations in  this sphere.  In  order to  reduce as  i~u 
as  possible the  dangers of such  a  development,  the  Community  should  make certain 
interpretative statements when signing (see Annex A). 
1.1 .2.  Cm1text o{  thCJ  Conference 
1\.  lnternwional context 
Overlishing worldwide has led many countries to initiate a process or improving systems 
for managing and conserving fisheries resources. 
This process, launched under the FAO in the eighties, led the United Nations Conference 
on Envir01m1ent and Development (UNCED) to draw up chapter  l 7 of Agenda 21  on the 
protection  of oceans  and  seas  when  concluding  its  discussions  in  Rio de Janeiro  in 
June 1992. 
The complexity of the matter led to  the convening of an  intergovernmental conference 
on straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species. 
The Cpnference's terms of reference for drawing up recommendations to be adopted by 
the General Assembly were set out as follows: 
the  Conference must approach  fishing  on  the  high  seas  in  the  widest  possible 
.  sense and must not t(Jcus solely on those of the stradd I  ing stocks which arc in the 
high seas; 
consideration  should  also  be  given  to  highly  n1igratory  species  and  in1proving 
·cooperation between states; 
the  F AO  has  been  closely  involved  m  providing  the  necessary  scientific  or 
technical information; 
the Conference may not be considered as a way of revising the relevant provisions 
of the UNLOSC.  The discussions and outcome of the  Conference must be in 
accordance  with the provisions of that Convention,  particularly  as  regards  the 
respective  rights  and  obligations  of the  coastal  states  and  states  interested  in 
fishing on the high .seas. 
The  United Nations General  Assembly confirmed  and  clarified  the  terms of reference 
given  to  the  Intergovernmental·  Conference  by  adoptii1g  Resolution  4 71192  ·on 
22 November 1992. 
As soon as the preparatory work commenced, a nun1ber of serious rifts emerged between 
the parties concerned. 
On  the  one  side  were the  coastal  states,  which  either  requested  that  the  exercise  be 
confined to the high seas and designed to recognize their "specific interests" for _biological 
ort:!IWr' ::rrtHPO!ll:!orT '  t  4 resources in  the part of the high seas adjacent to the wakrs umkr their jurisdiction nr 
went as far as asking for the right to impose unilateral conservation measures on the part 
of the stocks outside their EEZ. 
On the other sick were the states attached to the principle ol' the li·n·doJJJ ol' the high seas 
established by  the l INLOSC, and  these im:Judcd the  Lmopcan ( 'uJJlllHJJlily. 
From  this initial  stage what arc  termed the coastal states recciwd  the support of many. 
developing· countries  and  also  countries  with  a  tradition  or deep-sea  fishing.  such  as 
Norway and Russia. 
As  the  Conference  progressed,  the  Community  succeeded  in  having  h<Jsic  principles 
concerning compatibility and cohesion in the management of stocks on the high seas and 
in the  EEZ taken into account. 
The final  stage of the negotiations, centred on implementing measures.  was m·arked  by 
acceptance hy  a  growing number of states of the solutions proposed by  the  President o I' 
the Contercncc \\ith the active support of certain countries such as the  United States. 
The  Community  played  a  major  role  in  these  negotiations  by  frequently  leading  the. 
countries which !ish on the_high seas and at the same time defending rational prii1ciples 
ur management and conservation of fisheries resources.  -
The value placed by  the Community on rigorous managenlcnl principles vvas  not always 
viewed positively  by  our partners and all  the Community's negotiating objectives were 
not attained. 
The draft Agreement on straddling and highly migratory stocks \Vas  nevertheless widely 
supported by the inteniational community so that thei·e  is  little likelihood that il  could be 
successfully  renegotiated.  Rc:jection of the AgreeP1ent  should  make us  retlecl and we 
would  have  to  be  prepared  for  the  consequence.s  for  the  Community's  international 
fisheries relations. 
13.  Communi/\' conlexl 
The  need  to  ~1void trying  to  renegotiate  the  relevant  prnvJsJons  ol· the  United Nations 
Conference on th~: Law of the Sea was the leitmotiv of the negotiating directives adopted 
. by the Council. 
Other  particularly  important  factors  for  the  Community  were  incorporated  111  these 
directives: 
the need to  cooperate to achieve rational management of all  stocks: 
the decisive role of the regional fisheries organizations and  the need for them to 
be open: 
willingness  for  effective .implementing  machinery  to  be  established  with  the 
maintenance. irrespective of  the circumstances, of  the .i urisdiction of the tlag state; 
the need to strike a balance between the rights and obligations or the coastal states 
and  those of states fishing on the high seas. 
5 Ov~r and abow thcs~ objectives. the negotiating  dircctiv~·s stn  .. ·ssL·d  the  ncL·d  to negotiate 
in  a spirit which would obtain a consensus between the  Member Stall:s thcmselvl:s and 
also  f(.)r  approving  the  outcome  of the  Conference.  ·  By  maintaining  the  consensus 
between the Member States until the end of the negotiations, the Community was able 
to put forward strong positions.  It was sometimes difficult to work out common positions 
between  the  Commission and the Member States but  Community coordination worked 
throughout. 
· Without  ignoring  the  flaws  in  the  text  negotiated,  we  may  say  that  the  Community 
therefore achieved most of its objectives on the points which the Council considered at 
its meeting on 15  June 1955 to be the most important politically: 
the  fact  that  regional  fisheries  organizations  have  to  be  open,  it  having  been 
recognized  that:  "States  having  a  real  interest  in  the  fisheries  concerned  may 
become members of  such organization"  and that:  "The terms for participation ... 
shall  not  preclude such slates from  membership ...  n;1r  shall  they  he applied in a 
manner which discriminates  ... " (Article R(3)): 
muintenance of the jurisdiction of  the flag stale, it  being stall:d that "the inspecting 
state shall, at  the request of the  flag  state,  release the  vessel  to  the flag  state". 
(Article 21 ( 12)): 
the  balance in the respective obligations of the coastal states and the flag  states 
is reflected in the wording of Article 7. 
The Community succeeded in obtaining substantial improvements to many other parts of 
the text but it did not manage to prevent the negotiations ti·om  producii1g a less successful 
,  outcome on a number of points.  The most important of these are set out in Part Two of 
this paper. 
Annex I contains a  deta~led analysis of the various points of the Agreement with regard 
to  the objectives defined above. 
I.l.  3.  E{[ec:f.\·  on resource manm:emenr 
The  Agreement  reached  by  the  Con!Crencc  adds  aspects  <il"  lishcries  resources· 
management and conservation which are a useful  ~ompkment to  the existing law of the 
sea  provisions  although  the  agreed  text  fills  short  of the  optimum  sought  by  the 
Community on certain points. 
The introduction of the concept of a precautionary approach must be considered as an 
important and positive itmovation for  it'nproving fisheries 
· The reference  to  the  "biological  unity  ...  or the stocks"  is  a  way of countering coastal 
countries' attempts to  limit the application of the Agreement solely to  the  high seas and 
requires a  ~ohesive policy for the management and conservation of resources within and 
outside the EEZ  on the basis of the equal rights of all the states concerned. 
The principle of "compatibility" expressed in the Agreement makes it possible to· adopt 
in international waters measures which are not merely aligned on the measures taken by 
the coastal state in  its  EEZ;  although they are covered by different legal  systems they 
. !11ust  tend towards the same objective of optimum management or the same stocks. 
6 The Agreement s.trenglhcns the international cooperation obligation already contained in 
the  lJNLOSC.  This  obligation  concerns  ditlerent  aspects  of the  conservation  ·and 
management covered by  the draft Agreement. . 
First of all  it stresses the essential role to be played by  regional  fisheries organizations 
in  implementing fisheries resources management and conservation measures.  The role 
of these organizations is strengthened by the  introduction of supervision. 
It also strengthens cooperation on the assembly and  communication of information and 
cooperative el'tiJl'!s  in  scientific research, which  is  esse11tial  for  rational  use of  fisheries 
and  liu· ·evaluating  resources  in  order  to  coordinate  conscrvat ion  and  management 
measures  llllll'l' dlcdivcly. 
It  means that .lisheries will  be placed more firmly  in the context or environmental issues. 
since account will  he taken of the fact that species belong to  the  sa1i1c  ecosystem and of 
the  need  to  maintain  biodiversity  and  reduce  discards.  ll also  incorporate~, precise 
references in the direct management of the levels of fishing  etlo11. 
These various aspects should  help  improve fisheries  management overall and  they are 
aimed at the same objectives as the common fisheries policy. 
In  order to make the provisions .of the Agreement fully  eflective, the Community must 
not only make an etfort to  participate .and  make proposals within the  various fisheries 
organizations to  which it belongs but also encourage the  setting-up oforganizations of 
this kind whe!'ever necessary. 
7 II.  Part Two - Particular difficulties 
11.1.  Use  ()f.·forcc 
The reference to  the use of force is a subject of serious concern to. the Cmmmmity, as  it 
has emphatically made known throughout the negotiations and in the address delivered 
at the end of the Conference.  · 
This  reference  is  new  in  relation  to· the  texts  examined at previous  sessions  of the 
Conference.  Because on the high seas they could undertake  cer~ai1.1, pqlicing ot)eratioris' 
on  vessels  other tlwn  those  llying  their  llag,  certain  co;1stal  statc.s  felt  thi.s  -imr)licitly 
allowed the usc or force.  At the request of certain Member States, the Community asked 
for the use  of force  to  be explicitly prohibited in order to  n;:move  this ambiguity.' 
While  rel!,rcllinl!,  that the  President of the ConfCrencc did  not  take  fuller  account or the 
CommLmity's objections, the Commission note~ th-at  the text put to  the (\)nfcrcn~e lirriits 
the  use  of force to  legitimate  defence  and cases where  inspectors  are  prevented  fi·Qm 
carrying out their duties. 
The use of force should be an exceptional measure based on observance of the principle 
of proportionality and any  excessive or misplaced use of force  by  the  Inspecting  state 
should entail its iilternational responsibility.  ' 
The  financial  responsibility  clause  specific  to  the  policing  operations  under  this 
Agreement should act as a deterrent against undue use of force. 
In order to limit the possible disadvantages of this reference, the Commission considers 
its necessary: 
on the  one  hand.  when  the  Agreement  is hein_g  signed.  to  produce  a  fom1al 
ttcch.H11liun by ibc (\>Jnmullity gi\;lng an  interpretation that  is  in  accord~mce with 
international  Jc.~w of the circum.stancL:s In  which force might l1e  used to  app1y  the 
Agreement and to urge the strict observance of the principle ·of proportionality: 
on  the  other  han~ to  make· systematic  approaches  to  the  regional  fisheries 
org.alllizations of  which the Community is a member to l1ave protocols adopted by 
th.eru  -on  .  the  particular  circumstances  in  which  civilized · nations'  legal  and 
admirustrntive systems allow the·. use of  force. 
UL.  Gener.a1 enforqment 
The outcome of  the negotiations does not fully coincide with the Comm.uuity's views on 
·this point either. 
The Cnmmunity position on the principle of tacit consent to  t;ontroJ  operations on the 
high seas by a  vessel  other than the flag vessel  made accc.ptanL:e -conditional  upon the 
existence  .of  n  control  system  multilatcraHy  approved  hy  the  regional  1isheries 
organizations concemed. 
,.,_.· ;_ 
8 This condition is not  fulfilled  in  the  draft Agreement.  As a  result  ol' the Community's 
ol~jcction, howewr. the ( 'onli:rence adopted an overall contml systc111  which !,!.llaranh.:cs 
that a  lllillilllUill  amount or procedure will  he  lt>liOWCU  in  the  CVL'Il(  of hoarding on the 
high  seas.  It  has  furthermore  been  acknowledged  that  the  rules  or  the  regional 
organizations take precedence over the procedures laid down in the draft Agreement, the 
latter being applicable only two years after the adoption of the Agreement. 
The Community should therefore use this period to get the regional fisheries organizations 
of which  it  is  a  member  to  adopt  rules  of  procedure  vvhich  guarantee  effective 
implementation  of the  management  and  conservation  measures  decided  on  by  those 
organizations and  real  protection of the  individual  rights ol· the Community  fishermen 
who fish  in the waters covered by  these organizations  ... 
The Commission will consequently make appropriate proposals to the Council  for each 
of the organizations to which the Community belongs.  These proposals will  be adapted 
in  line  with  the  characteristics  of the  fishing  activities  managed  by  each  of these 
organizations. 
11.3.  Application to the developing countries 
The specific reference to developing countries is new in relation lo  the UNLOSC. 
Article 3(3)  allows  these  countries  to  derogate  from  the·  strict  requit'ements  of the-
Agreement  regarding  conservation and  management within  their  exclusive  economic 
zones. 
Even if  a developing country wei·e to make use of  this derogation. however, it would still 
be obliged, in view of the. general principle of takir\g due account of others' rights and 
obligations  ("due  regard  principle").  to  take a  minimum  number of the  conservation 
measures  i1eeded  to  avoid undermining the conservation .measures  taken  by the states 
fishing in the adjacent sector of the high seas. 
The other provisions or the Agreement concerning the developing. (.;ountries.  set out in 
Part VII.  largely  correspond  to  the  guidelines  generally  I()Jlowcd  by  Community 
development aid policy on .fisheries. 
9 Ill. Part Three - Competence 
l.  In  the preparatory work of the United Nations Conference on straddling stocks and 
highly  migratory  species, the Commission  and the  Member  States  preferred  to  a\,oid 
entering into fruitless, acrirnonious discussions on spheres of competence at a time when 
the  Community should  be  concentrating on  problems of substance  arising  during  the 
various sessions of the Conference.  In this way the Commission and the Member States 
roc used  their e!lorts on  drawing up  the common position  in  order  to  ensure  that. the 
Community took part  in  the Conference in  as cfTectivc, cohesive and  unified a  manner 
as possible.  . 
The issue of the allocation of competence arose when the revised negotiating directives 
wt:re  heing worked out for the final  session of the Con  terence  in  August  1995.  At its 
mccting·on 30 Muy, the Working Party on the External  Fisheries Policy had asked the 
Council's  Legal  Service  to  provide  it  with  ::1  written  opinion  on  the  allocation  of 
competence between the J·:uropean. Community and its  Member States in  order that the  · 
dran New York Agn:emenl could be signed and concllllkd on  the basis or th.: dran text 
\vhich existed following the fifth session of the Conference.  The Council's Legal Service 
considered in  its  opinion delivered on 26 June tluit the draft Agreement in  its entirety 
came within the sole competence of the Community under the common tisheries policy 
and  that the  final  clauses should be adapted accordingly.  This position  backs  up  the 
argument forexclusive competence which the Commission has always  put forward  in 
these circumstances. 
In  its  decisiori  of  13 July  authorizing  the  Commission  lo  negotiate  at  the 
New York Conkrcncc {Dt)c. 8&19/95  PEOHE 289), the Council stressed, however, that 
the  revised  .negotiating  directives  did  not  .pr~judgc  the  issue  of the  allocation  of 
competence between the European Community and its Mc1nher Stales on the hasis of the 
.draft text resulting from the .fifth session .of the Conference. 
J:l1  its statement of  30 June to·tbe Pennanent Representat1vcs L'otunJ.iltec the Commission 
,ag.tcd  that the Ctnmcil's -decision not .to .pr:ejud:ge 4he issue oLcompetence enabled the 
<Jffiun\i'SSKm 1~ negotiate neutral final clauses.. .  ,  . 
2. This  iis the context in which the CommisSion negatia~  the final.clauses, ·whrcb. do.not 
$Sl:e lhe ·matter  <Df ~  Article47 makes· prnv1sion  :for  fue  C.omn~ty·s 
·,nacession under  tlle  ·two pGssih'le OOnditions., with cither  .iom1 competence.  (Article 4V{l)) 
·•  ~ve  ·oompetence XArticle 47(2)}. 
A. Die ~on  :of  competence ·mUst now be settled and the Cammissien"co.nSiders that  ... 
:the ~ommwlity  has ·sole ~ence  ~the  Agreet'llmt (see ·Annex U •... · 
!It .is ,~  :ut\Jy  1Dc  European Cnmmu{tr which  n~y S.lgn· :and  :accede to the 
··,9eem:em in aooordance ·wilh Article 41(2)  ~of  the Agrecme.nt. 
ro 
'~~  .. 
.  '..·' CONCLUSION 
The New Yurk  Agreement is  the  fruit of a  lengthy, difficult negotiating process.  The 
states which took part in  the Conference were pursuing. in most areas. JilTcrent interests, 
which were in  many cases incompatible, and this  is  reflected  in  the  laboriously drafted 
provisions of the Agreement. 
Tile European Community was in the minority camp of the Conference. particularly v\ihen 
the  United States changed direction at the 4th session. 
In  this dinicult conll'xt. the  l:uropcan Community tnok  p;trt  in  lll'!'tlli:lliuns  which gave 
rise  tu  a  linal  tcxt  which admittedly causes us  problems httt  tH:vcrthekss  contain~' uscl"ul 
:tspects hdpl"ul  to  om intcrL'Sts. 
Following  adoption  of  the  Agreement  without  a  vote  by  the  Contcrence,  the 
European Community has a choice between three main options: 
Total rejection of the Agreement 
The  European  Community  refuses  to  sign  and  ratify  the  A!.!.reement  on  the 
grounds  that  it  is  inadequate  and  unbalanced.  The  main  consequence of this 
would  be  to  isolate  the  European Community, which  wt'luld  be  excluded  f'i·om 
future developments in international fisheries law and would face serious political 
ditliculties  in  its  bilateral  relations  with  countries  such  as  the  United  States, 
. Canada, Norway. Argentina and other Latin American countries. the Pacitic states 
and many developing countries which are  in favour of the  Agreement.  Even if 
the Community is  not party to  the Agreement and even i r  the Agreement cannot .. 
be  invoked against  the  Community, the  J\grecmcnt  wi II  nevcrlhclcss constitute 
international  law  recognized  by  a  considerable  majority  ur  the  international 
community. 
Signing or the  Agreement accompanied by a statement that it  \Viii  be  impossible 
to  ratify  the Agreement until the text has been improved. 
This approach would mean seeking renegotiation of the Agreement which could 
definitely not happen- or if it did, the Community would lind itself renegotiating 
in even more difficult and unfavourable conditions, \Vith  doubtful  prospects as to 
the  outcome.  The  European Community  would  be  accused  of calling  into 
question thc overall balance of the text, based on delicate compromises in  which 
it  itself took  part.  It  seems  highly  unlikely  that  the  discussions  would  be 
re-opened and this would not necessarily yield a better result. 
Signing of the  Agreement with an interpretative  statement on  the  points which 
cause the European Community ditliculty (use of force -jurisdiction of the  t1ag 
state on the high seas).  Ratification will take place at  a  later stage. 
This is  the option which is most favourable in  terms or cost/political benelit ratio 
and which must therefore be proposed by the Commission.  W~C would in  this way 
avoid being isolated from the rest of the world and we could 
(a)  play an active part and so supervise implementation of the  Agreement at 
the level of the regional organizations; 
11 (b)  play an active part in any dispute settlement procedures and in developing 
the resulting case law; 
(c}  promote our image: as advocates of responsible fisheries,  along the  lines 
of the  role  we  played. at the  FAO  in the  drawing-up  of the  Code  of 
Conduct~ 
(d}'  avoid; bilateral: diffiaulties with. our main partners, which arc in.  tavour of 
die New "iork Agreementl 
rz· ANNEX I 
Technical evaluation of the content of the Agre~mcnt 
I.  The tenus of reference adopted for this Conference by Resolution 47/192 of the 
United Nations General Assembly of22 December  1991  stipulated, inter alia, that 
the  Conference  should  promote  effective  application  of the  provisions  of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea concerning fish stocks and that 
the discussions and outcome of the Conference should be fully in accordance with 
the  relevant  provisions  of  that  Convention  (subsequently  referred  to  as 
"UNLOSC"). 
The title alone or the text of the Agreement adopted without a vote at  the closing 
meeting oi'the Conference on 4 August  1995 (subsequently rcl'crred to as "NYT") 
illustrates  tlwl  it  is  meant  to  be  a  legal  instrument  <Jimed  spccilically  at 
implementing the relevant UNLOSC provisions.  Article 4 of the NYT tays down 
that nothing in this  Agreement shall prejudice the rights. jurisdiction and duties 
of states under the Convention and that this Agreement shall  be  interpreted and 
applied  in  the context of and in a manner consistent with the  Convention.  This 
context shows clearly that the NYT fits properly into a hierarchy of law with the 
UNLOSC at the top and the NYT second.  The NYT is therefore to be interpreted 
and applied in the light of  the Convention and not vice versa.  There will certainly 
be  attempts,  however,  to  claim that the  Agreement rct1ccts  the  real  aim of the 
Convention or to raise it to the same level as the Convention.  Although it cannot 
be  denied  that  the  Agreement  is  intended  to  clarit~·  certain  provisions  of the 
Convention on fisheries, it is clear that it cannot go against either the letter or the 
spirit of the Convention.  This interpretation is  backed  tq) by Article 311  of the 
Convention, which prohibits the conclusion of  agreements the provisions of  which 
run counter to  the principles of  the UNLOSC.  It is  also a conscq uence of the tact 
that, unl i  kc  the Agreement concerning Part XI, the N YT  is  not designed to form 
an  integral part of the UNLOSC. 
2.  Articles 5.  6  and 7 of the NYT contain. basic provisions on  the  measures to  be 
taken  to  ensure. in a compatible manner, effective conscrTation of the resources 
in waters under the coastal states' national jurisdiction and  also  in  waters subject 
to  the rules  for  the high seas. 
Article 5  of the  NYT sets out  the  general  conservation  principles  already  laid 
down  in  Article 61  of the  UNLOSC on coastal  states and  in  Article  119 of the 
UNLOSC on states which fish on the high seas.  It also incorporates the principles 
\vhich  emerged  from  developments  \vhieh  took  place  after  the  UNLOSC,  1.e. 
Agenda 21 .. 
Article 6  of the NYT,  which  concerns the precautionary ai)proach,  does  indeed 
introduce new aspects.  It  nevertheless stipulates thm the  measures based on the 
precautionary approach must be  revised in  the  light of nc\1·  scicntilic data.  The 
clause therefore confirms the  principle  laid  down  in  !\rticks 61  and  119  ol' the 
UNLOSC whereby conservation measures must be taken on the  basis of the most 
reliable scientific data.  Article 6(7) of the NYT, which  provides for emergency 
measures, is  worded  in  neutral  terms which cannot be  said  to  grant the coastal 
· states special  rights. 
13 Article 7( I) or the NYT,  which deals with the cumpatihility or the CUllSetTation 
measures t6  h~ taken  within  the  zones  railing  li!H.iLT  the  coastal  states'  national 
.i urisdict ion  and  un  the high seas expressly conli nns the  coastal  states' sovereign 
rights  within  thl'ir  zones  and  all  stall's'  righls  Ill  lish  on  the  hi:-'.h  s•.:as. 
Articll'.  7(2)(a). most or which  is  worded  in ·line  \\ith the  dral'titll:~ proposal  llladc 
hy  the ( :ommunity at  the  last  negotiating session  <md  which  lhcrel(lrc meets one 
of the  priority  o~jectives set  by  the  Council  at  its  meeting  on  15  .June  \995. 
namely restoring the balance of the text on this point. seems rather to  place the 
emphasis on  the measures taken by the coastal  state.  This seems to  tic  in  with 
Article  116 of  the UNLOSC which lays down thi1t  all  states  have  the  right tor 
their nationals  to  engage  in  iishing  on  the  high  se:1s  subject  .to  the  rights  and 
duties as  well  as  the  interests of coastal  states.  This .is  only  one  aspect among 
others  to  be  taken  into  consideration.  the  others  being  for  example  the 
conservatiqn  measures  taken  by  the  regional  fisheries  organizations  and  the 
biolog_~l unity of the stocks (also aspects incllided in the text at the Community's 
instigation).  Consequently. this clause does not make it  obligatory for other states 
to  align  their action on  the  measures taken  by  the  cn<Jst<~l  state.  The  ha'lanecd 
natl_trc  of this  clause  stems  also  from  the  fact  that  it  is  not  accompanied  by  a 
clause  which.  if the  states  concerned  fail  to  agree  on  compatible  measures. 
compels the court required to give a ruling to  lay down pmtcctivc measures solely 
on the  basis of the  coastal  state's conservation  measures.  Already  at  .the  third 
United  Nations Conference  on  the  Law  of the  Sea Argentina  and  CLmada  had 
consistently called for  the  inclusion of a clause of this  kind. · The provisions of 
Article 7(4) and (5) nevet1heless guarantee that a proper course of action will be 
followed. 
A problem remains. however, regarding the precise meaning of the \vords "mutaris 
mutandis" in  Article 3(2) of the NYT in  relation to  the conservation measures to 
be  taken by  the coastal state.  If it  is  merely another way  or expressing the  legal 
difference  between  the  arrangements applicable  in  the  W<tters  under  the  coastal 
states'  national jurisdiction on  the  one hand  and  those applicable  in  the  waters 
· covered  by  the  rules  on  the  high  seas on  the  other.  this  clause  docs  not  seem 
prejudicial. but  precludes any control  by  international  authorities over measures 
adopted within the EEZ. 
3.  ·rhc  N  Y'l' places  the  cn1phasis  on  closer coopcn.ll ion  ln  order lo  ensure cllCcti vc 
conservation  or  the  lisherics  resources.  Artick X of the  NYT  identities  as  a 
means of cooperation the obligation to join a regional  lishcries organization or to 
agree to apply the conservation measures established by these organizations. The 
words "agreeing to  apply"  obviously entail  a degree of negotiation and  so  there 
is  no  automatic alignment with the conservation measures.  In  that  sense.  these 
words leave intact the traditional freedom to fish on  the high seas.  furthermore. 
as  an  essential  corol·lary  in  this  context,  At1icle  8(3)  of the  NYT  sets  out  the 
principle that the  regional  fisheries  organizations  must  be  open.  This too  is  a 
point which the Council regarded as essential at its meeting on  15  June  1995 and 
on which the Community has obtairied full  satisfaction.  States with a real interest 
in  these  fisheries  can  in  this  way  properly  meet  their obligation  to  cooperate. 
Article 8( 4) of the NYT prohibits access to the resources concerned tor states who 
refitse to  cooperate as  laid down.  It should be pointed out  that,  even  under the 
pt•esent  system,  tor  a  country  only  starting  to  iish  on  the  high  seas,  the  "due 
regard"  requirement  would  be  presumed  to  favour  established  usage  over  new 
14 IIS<Ig<.:  <llHi  Sll  Wn11id  l:lllail  Jilllils  011  aCCL:SS  ltll  that  ('(llilliiV  if  ill,·  rL'S<l\lrl"L' 
L'Otlccmcd  were In  hccotne scan.:c.  In  that sL:nse.  Article  X('!) ol' thL·  NYT doL:s  not 
seem  Lo  be a  step back in  relation lo the existing arrangemL:tlls. 
For  Article  ll(e)  of  the  NYT  which,  in  relation  to  the  new  members  or 
participants. states that, inter alia,  the needs of  coastal states whose economies are 
overwhelmingly dependent on the exploitation of living marine resources should 
be  taken  into account,  it should be  noted that here too  this  is  only  one  factor 
among others to be taken into account and it is  not a  priority  i~tctor.  The clause 
therefore gives no preferential right to the coastal states concerned. 
Taken literally. Article  16 of the NYT, which deals with the situation of part of 
the high seas entirely surrounded by the exclusive zone of a  single coastal state 
("enclaves")  is  neutrally worded.  It is  nevertheless  a  situation  in  which  it  is 
particularly  importaht to ensure the compatibility of the conservation measures 
involved.  If Article 16  is compared with Article 7.  particular signi!icance seems 
to be accorded in Article 16 to the measures taken hy  the co;1slal stale concerned. 
/\lthnugh it  is a  very specific case, this clause conlirms the general principle of 
compatibility. which. in  normal circumstances. must work  h~1th ways. 
4.  As a corollary to  the fi·eedom of the high seas, Article !J2  ol' the lJNLOSC gives 
the tlag state sole jurisdiction over vessels flying its llag on the high seas.  This 
jurisdiction of the  flag  state  is exclusive  in the  sense  that.  in  areas of the sea 
covered  by  the  arrangements  pertaining  to  the  high  seas.  it  prohibits  any 
intervention by another state and prevails over the jurisdiction of the state from 
which the crew originates.  Article 92(1) of the  UNLOSC  lays dov-m  that this 
principle  applies  other than  in  exceptional  cases  provided  for  in  international 
treaties or in  the Convention itself.  An exception to this principle is not therefore 
contrary to the Convention. 
Provision has already been made on this basis for certain exceptions:  piracy, the 
transport of slaves or unauthorized  broadcasting.  In  these cases. the  UNLOSC 
provides not  only for  the transfer of the right of intervention to a state other than 
the !lag sl<lte  hut  also the right  t(w  the intervening stalL'  to  take  s;~nctions against 
j1L'I'SOIJS  Oil  hllard  the  vessels concerned.  It  is  also  Oil  the  hasis or the options 
contained  in  Articles 1)2(1)  and  110  of the  lJNLUSC  that  international  joint 
i nspectinn  arrangements have  been  introduced.  On  the  s;unL:  has  is  states quite 
ti·equently conclude agreements on the control of partner states'  lis  hi ng vessels. 
To  quote  some  examples  relevant  to  fisheries.  there  is  the  1987  fisheries 
agreement bctwecn the Pacific island states and the United  States which provides 
for intervention rights over and above inspection, the 1994 lkring Sea Agreement 
which gave rise to the concept of continued boarding and  finally  the  agre~ment 
between the Commtmity and Canada to step up control in  NAFO waters·. 
The NYT provisions are geared to the idea that any effective conservation scheme 
must necessarily be accompanied by equally effective arrangements for ensuring 
that  the  conservation measures are  observed.  If the starting  point  is  effective 
conservation, it  is  difficult to find  a  reply to the argument that improved control 
mechanisms are needed  to  cope  with  a  situation  where  the  flag  slate  is  either 
unable or unwilling to take the required control measures in  respect or its  fishing 
vessels ;md  hence properly to assume its  n.:sponsihilitics as lbg slate. 
15 In  these. circumstances.  there  are  no  legal  objections  to  accepting  the  control 
system lnid down in Articles 21  and 22 of  the NYT since i  ntcrnationa! law leaves 
states every  Ji·eedom ·to com:  I  ude  international  agreements with  one another on 
transli.:rring the !lag  stat~.:'s powers.  1L  is  more a question nr advisability. 
The  priority  points  set  out  by  the  Count.:il  on  l'i June  [!)())  included  'thL: 
maintenance.  irrespective  or  circumstance.  or  the  llag  state's  jurisdiction  in 
accordance  with  international  law.  Under  the  control  procedure  set  out  in 
Article 21  of the  NYT and  for  the  stages  following  inspection,  the 1lag  state 
retains control over its vessels.  It decides, at the inspecting state's request, on the 
subsequent  action  it  considers  appropriate.  It  may  attach  conditions  to  its 
authorization and so limit the action which can be taken  by  the inspecting state. 
The Hag state can resume control over its vessels at  any  stage.  Lastly. the legal 
proceedings come within its remit.  The fact of being able to impose conditions 
on  the  inspecting  state  is  particularly  important  because  this  introduces  the 
principle of having specifically to obtain the consent of the  t1ag  state.  The fact 
that the tlag state is still responsible for the legal proceedings shows clearly that 
the procedure still falls far short of the action provided for,  by  way of example, 
in  Article I  09 of the UNLOSC concerning unauthorized broadcasting on the high 
seas. 
On the  other lmnd,  Article 21  is  not  completely clear  regarding  resumption or 
control  over  the  vessel  by  the  flag  state.  The  European Community  should 
therefore lodge an interpretative statement (see Annex A of the Communication). 
The tlag ship would not be able simply formally to  express its wish to exercise 
its jurisdiction over the  vessel.  Article  21  of the  NYT obliges  the  tlag state 
effectively to investigate its vessel and if necessary take enforcement action with 
respect to  it. 
The failure of the t1ag state to act after it has tormally declared its willingness to 
exercise its jurisdiction over its vessel does not give any other state any right of 
unilateral  interpretation  in  order to  assess  whether  the  flag  state  has  met  its 
obligations as set out in Article  19 of the NYT.  Any dispute has to be dealt with 
under the dispute settlement procedure. 
5.  The  following  can  be  gleaned  ti·om  the  above:  thL:  NYT does  not  affect  the 
principle  enshrined  in  the  UNLOSC  of the  200  nautical  mile  limit  as  the 
maximum  limit  for  waters  under  the  coastal  states'  national  jurisdiction.  As 
described above, the NYT contains nothing which might lead one to say that the 
coastal states, simply by the fact of being coastal states, arc enjoying preferential 
and special rights for  unilaterally  imposing conservation measures outside their 
waters.  On the contrary, the NYT confirms that, within these waters. the coastal 
states do not have absolute sovereignty devoid of any  legal  obligation regarding 
in  particular the conservation and management of fisheries resources. 
In  accordance with the UNLOSC, the NYT contirms that 1ishing on the high seas 
is  not  unlimited  but subject to the equal  right of other states and the  n.iles  on 
effective conservation of the frsheries resources concerned. 
In  appropriate  cases  and  by  international  agreement,  the  Convention  makes  it 
possible to restrict the princip-le of  the exercise of  sole jurisdiction of the flag state 
16 on the  high seas.  The control procedure provided for  (on a subsidiary basis)  in 
Articles 21  and 22 of the Agreement does not call this jurisdiction fundamentally 
into  question.  The  Convention  enables  other  members  of  the  regional 
organizations to initiate the random inspections needed to protect resources while 
ensuring that as long as they are carried out in  accordance with the rules of good 
tl1ith  (Article 300 of the Convention) no m iseonduct occurs. 
17 ANNEX II 
Exercise of Community competence 
I.  The  Community's  exclusive  competence  for  the  conservation  and management of 
fisheries resources 
The Community's exclusive competence tor the conservation and 111anagcment of  fisheries 
resources,  based  on  Article 43  of the  EC Treaty  and  Article  Ul2  or  the  1972  Act of 
Accessi(m, is 1:ecognizcd hy the Court of Justice. 
Consistent  case  law  (sec j,udgments  of  t 4 .July  1976,  Kramer.  3/76_  417(>  and  6/76, 
ECR p.  1279;  of 16 February 1978,  Conunission v  Ireland.  61177.  ECR  p.  417;  of 
25  .July  1991, Commission v Spain, C~258/89, ECR p.  1-3977: and of24 November 1992. 
Poulsen and Diva Navigation, C-286/90, ECR p.  I-6019)  shows that for the high seas the 
Community has;  in  matters within its powers, the same legislative competence as that 
· attributed by  international  law to  the  flag  state or the  state  in  which  the  vessel  was · 
registered. 
In  its  judgment of 24 November 1993  in  Case C-405/92  (Etablissement  Mondiet SA 
v S.a.r.l. Armement Islais, ECR 1993,  p.  6166), the Court of Justice of the  European 
Communities  held  that  the  Community  was  competent  to  adopt  measures  for  the 
conservation of fishing resources on the high seas in respect of vessels f1yii1g  the flag of 
a Member State or registered in a Member State. 
The question is  whether the New York Agreement comes under t:xclusive Community 
competence in  the light of Court of Justice case law. 
2  .. The draft agreement for the implementation of the  provisions or the  United Nations 
Convention on the Law of  the Sea of I 0 December 1992 relating to  the conservation and 
management  of stocks  of fish  which  are  found  both  inside  and  outside  exclusive 
economic zones and highly migratory fish  stocks 
The subject and the objective of  the Agreement are set out in  the preamble and Article 2. 
It is  laid down in Article 2 that the objective of  the Agreement is  to  ensure the long-term 
conservation and sustainable use of  straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks 
through effective implementation of the relevant provisions of the Convention. 
The same· objective is set out in the second recital of the preamble. 
Part II  of the  Agreement  (Articles 5,  6  and  7)  contains  the  basit:  prov1s1ons  on  the 
measures to be taken to attain the objective of conservation and  management in order to 
ensure both the viability and the optimum use of stocks 011 scit:ntilic bases by  applying 
the precautionary approach in accordance with Article 6.  Tht: parties <lre  also obliged to 
ensure that the conservation and management measures taken l'nr  tht:  high· seas and thflse 
taken tor zones covered by  national jurisdiction are compatible.  Tht: parties are subject 
to the obligations set out in Article 7 in order to ensure this compatibility. 
It  is  obvious that the  objective and the provisions of Part II on  the conservation and 
management  of the  stocks  concerned  come  under  the  exclusivt:  competence  of the 
. Community. 
18 .\::,·~·111  i.h .I  provides !'or  the  means. methods and  meck111isms  li1r  <ltlaining  tlK' 
_i i \ ._'  set  out  i  1.  ;\  rticle 1. 
; hc:-;e  :He  the  11h.:Chanisms  for  international  cooperatinn  {e.g.  or~~mizalions·  ~md 
<JITan~emcnts l'ur managing sLibregional and regional fisheries. thcit· functions and internal 
structures. the co 1  kct  ion and communication of inlormation ami  cnupcrat inn on scicnti lie 
research).  ubi igations  on  the  part  of non-member  states  and  nnn-part icipants  in  the 
regional  organizations. the measures to  be  taken by  the  port  state.  the  means by  which 
the developing countries can participate in the implementation of the Agreement. dispute 
settlement  proc~.:durcs. sa!Cguard  clauses <1nd linal clauses. 
Thl.'  t\gru:mcnt as  <l  \\hole enmcs under the c:-.:clusive  compcll'lll'L'  'l[' the  C'ollllllllni ty  i r 
the  purls nl' the  Agreement mentioned uboye arc  or an  accessory  n<~lun.: in  relation to  the 
main objecli\'c nl'thc Agreement or if they are covered by  the common fisheries  policy. 
Parts  III  and  IV  (Articles 8 to  17)  concern international  cooperation on  fisheries  by  the 
parties concerned.  This cooperation, which is desigried to  implement as  l'ully as possible 
the conservation and management measures laid down in  Articles 3 to  7.  is  also covered 
by  the  common fisheries policy. 
This  is  why  the  Community  is  a  member of many  regional· and  subregional. fisheries 
organizations.  For example, the Community is a member of the N.-\FO. the NEAFC, and 
the  Baltic Sea Commission.  and  it  alone  executes  the  obligati,)ns  impcised  by  these 
agreements.  The Community has also concluded many  tisheries agreements with other 
countries  containing  various  types  of  obligations  such  as  scicnti lie  and  technical 
cooperation and  aid  !'or training fishermen in the developing count1·ics.  It  has concluded 
wh~1t  is  termed  <l  "second-generation  agrcemc1it"  with  Argcntin;l  allll  this  contains 
provisions  li1r  the  setting-up  of joint  ventures,  etc.  The  ( "ommunity's  excl.usive 
competcnc~: un  the  basis or the  common  fisheries  policy  has  hl'L'Il  recognized  tn  many 
cases. including agreements which are varied and complc:-.:  in  content. 
Articles  18  to 23  lay  down the means to  be deployed by  states in  order properly to  meet 
the  commitments made  in  Articles  5 to  7.  These provisions arc  intended  for .the  t1ag 
slate, which. in  accordance with  the rules of public international  Llw.  is  responsible for 
vessels t1ying  its  Hag.  These Articles do  not concern the  right  to  !ly a flag  as  such. for 
which it  is  obviously the  Member States that are competent. 
Articles  18  to  23  oblige the  t1ag  states to  use  the  instruments a\ailahlc to  them  under 
public international law· arid  their national law to ensure  implemcnt~1tion nf the measures 
set out in  the  Agreement. 
!n  administrative and  practical  terms it may  be  the  Member Stales  which  will  have to 
honour commitments accepted  by  the  Community in  an  internati"llal  agreement on  the 
basis or ComnHmity competence:  this would include control llh.:asurcs and administr;1tivc 
s:mctions  in  !he  cwnt or inti"ingcment.  This -is  cust(lt1lary  under till' ( 'lllnmunity's !t."ga! 
system  (sec  Article  221.\(7)  of the  Treaty)  and  has  no  impact  nn  the  scope  of the 
Community's competence for concluding an international agrcen1L'Il\.  lt is only  lcgi~lative 
competence  \Nhich  is  considered  for  concluding  internationa.l  agreements  and  not 
administrative competence (see Opinion 2/91  of the Court.  recital  ~4). 
The  rules  •Jt'f  ·l;c  inspection  t1!'  fishing  ves?els  have  alre:~dy  rc,rmed  the  subjr:Ct  of 
iniemati;~··:~ai  :.~grt!em~nts concluded by the Community. for  exan1pk >vith  the NAFO or 
11 Canada.  Provisions  of this  type  are  instruments  for  implementing  conservation  nr 
management  measures.  which  may  be  one  of  the  main  subjccts  of  an  agreement 
concludcd by the Community under the common lisheries policy.  l Jndcr the consistent 
case  law of the  Court,  the  Community's  competence  ror  legislating  on  a  matter  (e.g. 
Article 43  ol"  the  Treaty  for  the· common  organization  uf agricultural  markets  or  the 
common  lisheries  policy)  includes  competence  for  making  Member  States  adopt 
implementing measures. which. as and where needed to ensure proper implementation or 
Cqmmunity standards. may include control measures and administrative sanctions. 
More  especially,  with regard  to  the  matter of judicial  proceedings  and  sanctions  for 
infringements  (Article  19(2))  and  legal  assistance  between  parties  to  the  Agreement 
(Article 20(5)),  there  is  Community  competence  for  implementing  administrative 
sanctions (see judgment of27 October 1992 in Case C-240/90- Germany v Commission). 
t\s regards pcn:1l  sanctions and  legal assistance (noti1ication or pmof to  the authorities 
or other contracting parties). the Member Statcsare hound. under the Trt:aty. to  lay down 
sanctions of this  kind  in  their respective  national  legislation. ir they  arc  necessary  to 
ensure observance of Community law.  A general duty of this kind  is  recognized hy the 
Court's ·  case  law  (see  judgments  of  21  September 19X9  in  Case 68/88 -. 
Commission v Greece, ECR 1989, p.  2965;  of 27 March !990 in  Cnse C-9/89 - Spain 
v CounciL ECR 1990, p. I-1383 (I-1412) and Community legislative pmctice (examples 
are  Article 7(l)(b)  of  Council Regulation (EEC) No 3842/86  (OJ No L 357,  p.  I); 
Articles 31  and 32 of  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 (OJ No L 261, p.l.)).  Even 
this  part  of the  Agreement  does  not  require  the  Member  States'  participation  in  the 
Agreement because the provision in question does not go beyond this general duty of the 
Member States and the customary clauses in  Community legislntion .. 
The  fact  that Article 21 (5),(6) and (7)  lays down a  system  whereby  a  state which has 
carried  out an  inspection  and  ascertained  that  the  Agreement  has  been  infringed  mav 
board and possibly take control of the vessel does not alter this situation. 
It  \Vould seem advis::~ble. in order to dispel any possible misunderst;mdings. to s\rcss that. 
.despite the existence or  Community competence I(Jr accepting undertakings in litis sphere. 
the  Member States still have competence for - and the duty to take  - the  gcne.ral  and 
special  implementing  measures  required  under  Community  law.  In  specific  cases,  it 
would  be  the  authorities  of the  flag  state  which  would  have  tn  give - or  refuse -
authorization tor inspection by  non-nationals. 
On the subject of the Articles on dispute settlement. the Court or Justice ·decided in its 
Opinion  1194  delivered on 15  November 1994 that competence  f{x participating in  the 
mechanisms of  dispute settlement arose from competence concerning_ the main provisions. 
The principle whereby the decision on the main issue applies to accessory matters applies 
to  the  Articles on certain procedures or particular problems. such as  Article  14,  which 
covers the collection and provision of information and cooperation in  scientific research 
for  the purposes of the conservation and management of fisheries resources. 
The  provisions of Articles 24  to  26  in  Part Vll  of the  Agreement  - "Requirement of 
developing states"  - are of an accessory nature in relation to  the  main  ol~jectivc ·of the 
Agreement.  These  Articles  provide  for  the  means  lor  effective  participation  Cll.  the 
developing countries in  the long-term conservation and sustainable use of the stocks. 
These provisions are  not concerned with the economic development of the developing 
countries but set out the forms of  cooperation with these states, which to  a certain degree 
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